The Deadly Populism of President Putin in Russia

In the 21st century, European and United States voters increasingly vote for populists. In 2016, populist Donald Trump became president of the democratic country with the world’s largest economy, despite opposition from the American political establishment. Modern political scientists fear populists are ready to sacrifice democratic institutions to retain power.

Populism is considered a vice of democracy. Populists make unrealistic pre-election promises and rely on emotions rather than persuasion. They claim they oppose a “corrupt” political elite or an external “enemy” together with the people. Populists are liquidating independent media and civic organizations and manipulating elections. As a result, democratic institutions are dismantled, the political system degrades, and international conflicts arise. This is precisely what happened in Russia in the 21st century. Russian democracy was new and unstable, so it quickly collapsed under the pressure of populists.

By looking at Russia as an example, American and European voters can see the destructive outcome of populist rule and be more cautious in their country’s elections. In the end, the electoral ratings of populists in the United States and Europe may cool down because of Russia.

One might think that there is nothing to fear. Western democracies have stable institutions and can withstand the rise of a populist leader. But how tough are Western governments facing global pandemics, economic crises, or international conflicts?

Moreover, Russia’s experience shows that populism is not just a vice of democracy. On the contrary, Russian czars laid the foundations of populism in the context of autocratic monarchy. Thus, populism is a separate tool of the struggle for the conquest and retention of power and is not only a vice of democracies.

When and where populism can be dangerous?

The international scientific community is drawing attention to the anti-pluralism and anti-democratic tendencies of populist leaders. The rise of populists to power threatens society by sliding into authoritarian regimes and limiting rights and freedoms. After the 2016 presidential elections in the United States, Donald Trump’s victory entered scientific discourse as the most prominent example of a successful populist strategy, which is extremely dangerous for democracy (1).

Prominent researchers of populism in Europe, such as Cas Mudde (2) and Jan-Werner Mueller (3), warn that populist movements threaten democracy, the very system that gives birth to them. Furthermore, researchers from the economic school of populism directly link the decline in economic growth rates to the rise of populists to power. Based on an analysis of countries’ economies where populists came to power from 1900 to 2018, experts discovered that populists are costly for citizens because the economies of these countries were slowing down (4).

Nevertheless, the influence of populism in current public policy is growing. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it is widely accepted in democratic countries that politicians should fulfill the people’s will. Secondly, emotions have become a tool for captivating voters because all political parties have become the same, pragmatic, and lost ideology. Thirdly, modern media and social networking provide politicians unlimited access to a broad audience. This is the direct democracy that populists often talk about! Finally, politicians can communicate with potential voters without extensive political experience. Sometimes, having a Twitter account and a professional team of copywriters and marketers is enough.

In addition, the importance of commercial sales tools is growing in current public policy. Politicians act like marketers, striving to meet the expectations of their target audience and differentiate themselves from their competitors. For example, a populist can charm the public by offering simple solutions to complicated problems, using emotional rhetoric, and adopting an anti-establishment stance. This is how a politician gains power.

Therefore, it is logical that in democratic countries, many politicians employ populist tactics in their electoral campaigns regardless of their ideological affiliation. The confrontational essence of populism aligns well with competitive elections. However, in stable democracies, the presence of populists is compensated by a system of checks and balances, independent courts and the media, and stable civil society institutions.

On the other hand, in new democracies, public institutions are fragile and easily destroyed under the influence of a populist leader who seeks to stay in power as long as possible. Russia’s experience in the 21st century provides a clear view of the consequences of a populist coming to power. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, democratic institutions in the country were weak and unstable, so their dismantling in the 2000s proceeded quickly.

Meanwhile, Russian society had yet to embrace civil rights and freedoms fully. Instead, it unknowingly relinquished them in favor of the populist narrative of the need to ‘fight’ a “common external enemy.” As a result, since the beginning of the 21st century, Russia has gradually drifted toward authoritarianism, where populist tools were used not for conquest but for maintaining power and supporting the approval rating of President Vladimir Putin. The immutability of the populists after the elections led to the revival of authoritarianism in Russia.

Russia has become a vivid example of democracy’s destruction with the populist leader. The problem would have remained purely national for Russia if it weren’t for the populist desire to maintain power through “small victorious wars.” In February 2022, the populist formation of the “Putin majority” in Russia and the president’s imperial ambitions culminated in a military invasion of Ukraine.

What has populism led to in Russia, and what will happen next?

 Populism in public politics is not just a problem in democratic countries. It can also develop within authoritarian regimes, such as the Russian Empire. The difference is that in democratic governments, politicians use populist methods to gain power in elections, while in autocracies, populism becomes state-driven, aimed at maintaining control and uniting people around the leader. Vladimir Putin’s presidency in the 21st century has become an example of transforming a European democratic country into an authoritarian dictatorship in just 20 years. In the 21st century, President Putin employs the basic tenets of populism formulated almost two centuries ago during the reign of Tsar Nicholas I in the theory of official nationality, according to which Russia should fight the West to preserve traditional values, with the Tsar representing the unified will of the people.

In 2012, after mass protests by Russians triggered by falsifications in the Russian State Duma elections, the Russian government realized that the populist measures taken to form a “Putin majority” were insufficient to maintain the president’s power. Therefore, a decision was made to halt modernization in the country. To this end, the Russian government restored the idea of past imperial greatness in the public consciousness, following the example of the USSR, and in 2014, annexed Crimea. As a result, the concept of progress and prosperity was replaced by the eternal struggle against the hostile “collective West” to preserve Russian values and regain former Russian territories. Thus, Putin elevated the conflictual populism basis to the status of a state ideology.

The Kremlin has made Putin a Russian defender against the “bad” West, on the one hand, and against the “bad” Russian political elite, on the other hand. That is why all branches of the Russian government were subordinated to the president. He knows best what the people want. After all, he receives all the information about Russians’ “real” desires directly through referendums, “live broadcasts,” the All-Russia People’s Front, and the president’s public receptions.

Furthermore, Putin’s administration employs a complex strategy to create the illusion of unity within Russian society. In addition to destroying independent media, the Russian government rewards loyal citizens with subsidies while intimidating and imprisoning opposite Russians.

The expansion of Putin’s authority and the state agencies’ formation was based on loyalty rather than competence. That is why the degradation of the Russian political elite happened. They started making mistakes, including the invasion of Ukraine.

As a result, ordinary citizens will pay for the political mistakes of the populist government regardless of the outcome of the military conflict in Ukraine. Some have already paid with their lives, falling victim to shelling or serving in the regular Russian army. Those who survive will either pay reparations for the reconstruction of the devastated neighboring state, finance the seized territories’ development, and provide social support to the “new” citizens who have lost their jobs and property due to the war.

This will further lag behind the Russian economy compared to technologically advanced countries due to military defeat and European sanctions. In turn, social and economic hardships will deepen the dependence of Russians on state subsidies. This will strengthen the authoritarian regime and consolidate society around the Dictator.

Thus, we are now witnessing the destruction of a country’s economy that succumbed to state populism. Furthermore, the big European country, Russia, has officially turned towards the East, aligning itself with non-democratic nations, thereby undermining global democratic values. Russia has become a clear example for Europe and the United States of why populists should not be allowed to come to power if people want to save their democracy.

REFERENCES

1. Steven Levitsky; Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (New York: Crown, 2018), 320.
2. Mudde, Cas; Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira, Populism: A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 6.
3. Jan-Werner Mueller, What is populism? (Moscow: Higher School of Economics, 2018), 37-38.
4. Manuel Funke; Moritz Schularick; Christoph Trebesch, The cost of populism: Evidence from history, Voxeu Column CEPR, 16 Feb 2021.